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The article reviews legislative history and supervisory practices related to bank holding 
companies with a view toward understanding what Congress meant by referring to the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System as the "umbrella supervisor" in the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. The first part of the article looks at the historical development 
of bank holding company law and regulation, which laid the foundation for the current 
practice of umbrella supervision.  The second part of the article provides answers to 
questions related to the Board's current role as umbrella supervisor: What does “umbrella 
supervision” mean, and is it different from “consolidated supervision”? How does the 
GLB Act limit the Board’s authority and practice and when did the Board obtain all of 
the legal authority to allow it to practice umbrella supervision?  
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I.  Introduction 
 
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (“Board”) acts as an “umbrella supervisor” under 
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLB Act”). Depending on the context, the GLB Act might be described as 
retaining, preserving, keeping, confirming, continuing, acknowledging, blessing, endorsing, expanding, 
appointing, assigning, choosing, granting, or establishing the Board in its role as umbrella supervisor, 
consolidated supervisor, comprehensive regulator, overall supervisor, super-regulator, or regulatory czar. 
The broad array of descriptive terms used reflects the ongoing debate over the appropriate role of the 
Board in financial institution supervision. Moving beyond the Board’s status as “umbrella supervisor” to 
its specific functions as umbrella supervisor raises even more questions. As Comptroller Eugene Ludwig 
has observed, “[t]he metaphor of the umbrella has obvious appeal. It evokes safety and security. But we 
need to move beyond imagery to specifics. What exactly do we mean by umbrella supervision?”
1  
This article reviews legislative history and supervisory practices related to bank holding companies and 
their subsidiaries with a view toward understanding what Congress meant when it referred to the Board as 
an “umbrella supervisor” in the GLB Act. Part II of this article reviews the historical development of bank 
holding company law and regulation which laid the foundation for the practice of umbrella supervision.
2 
And Part III provides answers to questions regarding the Board’s role as umbrella supervisor: What does 
“umbrella supervision” mean? Is “consolidated supervision” different? How does the GLB Act limit the 
Board’s authority and practice? When did the Board obtain all of the legal authority to allow it to practice 
umbrella supervision? When did “umbrella supervision” come to commonly refer to a set of supervisory 
practices? What is the relationship between the umbrella and other supervisors? Part IV sums up the 
answers to these questions. Umbrella supervision is a set of supervisory practices conducted within the 
scope of the Board’s legal authority. “Umbrella supervision” is used as a synonym for “consolidated 
supervision” and as a distinct term referring to another set of supervisory practices. The Board possessed 
all the powers necessary for it to practice umbrella supervision in 1983, although its authority expanded to 
functionally regulated subsidiaries in 1999. The Board’s authority over functionally regulated subsidiaries 
is limited regarding capital, reports, examinations, and enforcement. The phrase “umbrella supervision” 
came into common usage in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The relationship between the umbrella and 
                                                 
1 Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Before the American Enterprise Institute (Oct. 9, 1997), 
available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/97-91.txt.  
2 See generally, CARTER H. GOLEMBE ASSOCIATES, THE BANK HOLDING COMPANY ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1970: A 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1-5 (1971); CHARLES G. BLAINE, FEDERAL REGULATION OF BANK HOLDING COMPANIES 1-1 
to 1-4, 2-1, and 4-1 to 4-2 (1973); PAULINE B. HELLER, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL BANK HOLDING COMPANY LAW 
xvii-xix  and  349  n.172  (1976); and STAFF OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS,  THE  BANK  HOLDING  COMPANY 
MOVEMENT TO 1978: A COMPENDIUM (1978) at 21-68 [hereinafter Compendium]. 
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other supervisors is defined by primary and secondary roles, statutory responsibilities, and supervisory 
cooperation. 
 
II.  Historical Developments 
A.  The Banking Act of 1933 and Other Pre-Gramm-Leach-Bliley Legislation 
1.  Banking Act of 1933 
 
Bank holding company supervision by the Board began with the Banking Act of 1933 (“Banking Act”).
 
The Banking Act, among other matters, created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”),
3 
prohibited affiliations between banking and securities underwriting firms, and otherwise separated banking 
and commerce.
4 It also added section 23A to the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 (“FR Act”), which limited 
transactions between a member bank and its affiliates,
5 while leaving in place many advantages of Federal 
Reserve membership, such as obtaining loans and services from Federal Reserve Banks. 
The Banking Act authorized the Board to gather information on affiliates of member banks.
6 First, the 
Banking Act required each member bank to obtain information from each of its affiliates, other than 
member banks, and to furnish to the Board reports containing such information as “shall be necessary to 
disclose fully the relations between such affiliate and such bank and to enable the Board to inform itself as 
to the effect of such relations upon the affairs of such bank.”
7 Second, the Banking Act allowed the Board 
to obtain directly from affiliates “additional reports as may be necessary in order to obtain a full and 
complete knowledge of the condition of the affiliated member bank.”
8 Finally, the Banking Act required a 
“holding company affiliate” to obtain a voting permit from the Board before it voted any member bank 
stock that it owned or controlled.
9 In applying for a voting permit, the affiliate had to agree to certain 
conditions, including the maintenance of certain reserves, the requirement that dividends paid by the 
holding company be paid only out of actual net earnings, submission of reports, and consent to “such 
examinations of such holding company affiliate as shall be necessary to disclose fully the relations 
between such banks and such holding company affiliate and the effect of such relations upon the affairs of 
                                                 
3 Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, § 8, 48 Stat. 162, 168 (1933) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 12 U.S.C.). 
4 Id. at §§ 16, 20, 21, 32, 48 Stat. at 184, 188, 189, 194.  
5 Id. at § 13, 48 Stat. at 183 (“No member bank shall (1) make any loan . . . from, any of its affiliates.”). 
6 Id. at § 5(c), 48 Stat. at 165 (“Each bank . . . shall obtain from each of its affiliates . . . not less than three reports 
during each year . . . [and] such additional reports as . . . may be necessary.”). 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at §§ 5(c), 19, 48 Stat. at 164, 186 (“Any such holding company affiliate may make application to the Federal 




10 The applicable definition of “holding company affiliate” included any corporation owning 
or controlling 50% or more of the voting shares of a member bank.
11 Thus, while one-bank holding 
companies were subject to the voting permit provisions of the Banking Act if they owned or controlled the 
requisite percentage of member bank stock, bank holding companies that only owned or controlled the 
stock of nonmember banks were not subject to the voting permit requirement.  
The Board issued Regulation P to implement the voting permit provisions of the Banking Act.
12 The 
regulation required applicants to submit detailed information with a request for a voting permit, including 
their last audit by an independent auditor, a statement regarding management, a list of all subsidiaries, a 
statement of financial condition, and a copy of the last report of examination of each subsidiary of the 
applicant.
13 It also set forth conditions with respect to the issuance of a voting permit, such as the holding 
company’s agreement to: (1) permit examinations of its affairs, and those of each banking or other 
organization owned or controlled by the holding company; (2) publish individual or consolidated 
statements of condition of the subsidiaries of the holding company; (3) declare dividends only out of actual 
net earnings; (4) maintain required reserves of readily marketable assets; (5) furnish information required 
by the Board; and (6) divest any interest in a securities company within 5 years.
14 In 1934, the Board’s 
annual report to Congress included the following statement about its examination of holding company 
affiliates:  
 
In connection with the consideration of applications of holding company 
affiliates for voting permits, arrangements were completed, wherever practicable, 
to have the various banks controlled by the same holding company affiliate 
examined as nearly as practicable as of the same date in order that a 
comprehensive picture of the entire group might be obtained and information 
concerning various relationships within the group be developed. Such 
arrangements were worked out in cooperation with the chief national bank 
examiners in the various districts and the State banking authorities, the national 
banks being examined by the national bank examiners and the State banks by the 
State authorities and examiners for the Federal Reserve banks.
15 
                                                 
10 Id. at § 5(c), 48 Stat. at 164.  
11 Id. at § 2(c), 48 Stat. at 163. (“The term ‘holding company affiliate’ shall include any corporation . . . [w]hich 
owns or controls . . . . either a majority of shares . . . or more than 50 per centum of the number of shares . . . .). 
12 Regulation P, Series of 1933, Holding Company Affiliates—Voting Permits, 19 Fed. Res. Bull. 505 (1933). 
13 Id. at 509.  
14 Id. at 511.  




In 1935, Congress added a provision to the Banking Act that resulted in the Board granting exemptions 
from the voting permit requirement for most one-bank holding companies.
16  
 
2.  Legislative Proposals from 1938 to 1955 
 
Beginning in 1938, Congress considered a number of bills providing for the regulation of bank holding 
companies.
17 Indeed, such bills were introduced in Congress in 1938, 1941, 1945, 1947, 1949, 1950, and 
1953.
18 Some of these bills were referred to committee, some led to hearings, and several were reported 
out of committee. Yet no action was taken on them by either the full House or Senate.
19 While none of 
these bills became law, they illustrate the perceived weaknesses in banking law and proposed responses in 
the period preceding the enactment of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. Among the perceived 
weaknesses in banking law were the confusion and delay caused by overlapping regulatory authorities and 
the ability of bank holding companies to exercise control over banks while avoiding supervision. Proposed 
responses ranged from registering and supervising bank holding companies to eliminating them altogether.  
In 1943, the Board’s report to Congress described its regulation of bank holding companies: 
 
Regulation of bank holding companies by the Board is effected through the specific 
statutory powers to grant, withhold, or revoke voting permits, and through agreements 
predicated upon the general statutory powers and responsibilities of the Board and 
required to be executed by holding companies before obtaining voting permits from the 
Board. The purpose of those statutes and agreements is that the holding companies and 
their subsidiaries, including member banks and nonmember banks, whether insured or 
uninsured, shall maintain sound financial condition and proper management policies and 
                                                 
16 Banking Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-305, § 301, 49 Stat. 707 (1935). The Board adopted amendments to 
Regulation P to reflect this change. 21 Fed. Res. Bull. 857 (1935). (“The term ‘holding company affiliate’ shall have 
the meaning given to it by section 2(c) if the Banking Act of 1933.”). The Board also adopted a standard agreement 
for applications for voting permits consistent with these changes. 1935 FED.  RES.  BD.  ANN.  REP.  217  (1936) 
(“Standard provisions of agreement required as condition precedent to granting general voting permits”); see 
generally, Compendium, supra note 2, at 35, 38, 39 (“Two years later, the Banking Act of 1935 included a provision 
that resulted in exemptions from the 1933 Act for most one-bank holding companies.”). 
17  See e.g.,  S.  REP.  NO.  84-1095, at 3-5 (“Defin[ing] ‘banking holiding companies,’ control[ling] their future 
expansion, and require[ing] divestment of their nonbanking interests . . . .”). 
18 S. 76, 83d Cong. (1953); S. 3547, 81st Cong. (1950); S. 2318, 81st Cong. (1949); S. 829, 80th Cong. (1947); H.R. 
3351, 80th Cong. (1947); S. 792, 79th Cong. (1945); H.R. 2776, 79th Cong. (1945); S. 310, 77th Cong. (1941); S. 
3575, 75th Cong. (1938). 
19 S. REP. NO. 84-1095, at 3-5 (1955). 
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The Board’s report went on to recommend legislation “preventing further expansion of existing bank 
holding companies or the creation of new bank holding companies” to prevent the circumvention of sound 
banking principles, existing statutes, and public policy.
21  
In 1955, several bills were introduced in the House and Senate to regulate bank holding companies.
22 The 
Board’s Chairman, William M. Martin, Jr., supported the regulation of one-bank holding companies in 
testimony before the House Banking and Currency Committee on February 28, 1955, where he observed 
that “potential abuses resulting from combination under single control of both banking and nonbanking 
interests could easily exist in a case in which only one bank is involved,” and, as a result, the Board would 
urge that “the definition should be related to control of a single bank.”
 23 This statement embodied a shift 
in Board posture toward bank holding companies. Although the Board had recommended legislatio
preventing further expansion by existing bank holding companies and the creation of new bank holding 
companies in its 1943 Annual Report to Congress, it sought more expansive authority to supervise one-
bank holding companies in 1955.  
n 
                                                
 
3.  Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 
 
In 1956, Congress enacted the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (“BHC Act”),
24 which required 
registration of companies controlling two or more banks. The BHC Act defined a bank holding company, 
controlled the formation and expansion of bank holding companies, limited bank holding companies to the 
 
20 1943 FED. RES. BD. ANN. REP. 44. 
21 Id. at 37. The Board also sought to limit the expansion of bank holding companies through administrative action. 
In 1948, the Board initiated proceedings against Transamerica under section 7 of the Clayton Act based on the anti-
competitive effect of its acquisitions of stock in 48 banks in five Western states. In 1952, the Board ordered 
Transamerica to dispose of the stock of its majority-owned banks. Transamerica Corp., 38 Fed. Res. Bull. 368 
(1952). Transamerica sought relief in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. In 1953, the appeals court reversed the 
divestiture order of the Board on the grounds that the Board failed to prove that the acquisitions of these banks either 
substantially lessened competition or tended to create a monopoly.
 Transamerica Corp. v. Bd. of Governors, 206 
F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1953) (“Order of the Board was set aside because it did not make any findings regarding the 
tendency of the acquisitions to lessen competition or create monopoly in the local communities where the acquired 
commercial banks operated.”). See generally, GERALD C. FISCHER, BANK HOLDING COMPANIES 66-68 (Columbia 
Univ. Press 1961). (Discussing Transamerica.). The Supreme Court declined to hear the case on petition for review. 
Transamerica Corp. v. Bd. of Governors, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953). 
22 See, e.g., S. 880, 84th Cong. (1955); H.R. 2674, 84th Cong. (1955); H.R. 6227, 84th Cong. (1955).  
23 Control and Regulation of Bank Holding Companies: Hearing on H.R. 2674 Before the H. Comm. on Banking 
and Currency, 84th Cong. 15 (1955). 
24 Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133.  
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business of banking or managing and controlling banks, and required divestiture of nonbanking interests 
unless they met one of many exceptions. The principal determinant of status as a bank holding company 
was control of two or more banks.
25 The primary criterion for determining control was ownership or 
control of 25% or more of the voting shares of a bank.
26 The BHC Act included many exemptions from 
registration as a bank holding company for agricultural, educational, religious, charitable, and other 
organizations. Furthermore, it did not regulate individuals or partnerships owning or controlling banks.  
The BHC Act included the following provision related to supervision and examination by the Board: 
 
The Board from time to time may require reports under oath to keep it informed as to 
whether the provisions of this Act and such regulations and orders issued thereunder have 
been complied with; and the Board may make examinations of each bank holding 
company and each subsidiary thereof, the cost of which shall be assessed against, and 
paid by, such holding company. The Board shall, as far as possible, use the reports of 
examinations made by the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance 




The BHC Act did not subject one-bank holding companies to Board regulation and supervision. Rather, 
one-bank holding companies became subject to the Board’s jurisdiction under the FR Act only if they 
applied for a permit to vote the stock of a member bank. In its report submitted to Congress pursuant to 
section 5(d) of the BHC Act, however, the Board began to recommend repeal of the voting stock permit 
requirement.




4.  Supervision of One-Bank Holding Companies 
 
In 1966, Congress once again considered requiring the registration of one-bank holding companies when it 
passed amendments to the BHC Act (“1966 Amendments”).
30 While the 1966 Amendments repealed 
                                                 
25 Id. at § 2(a), 70 Stat. at 133.  
26 Id.  
27 Id. at § 5(c), 70 Stat. at 137. This language was identical to §4(c) of H.R. 2674, as introduced in the House on 
January 20, 1955, and §4(c) of S. 880 as introduced in the Senate on February 1, 1955. 
28 44 Fed. Res. Bull. 794-95 (1958); see also Compendium, supra note 2, at 41, 42. 
29 44 Fed. Res. Bull. 781 (1958). 
30 Pub. L. No. 89-485, 80 Stat. 236 (1966).  
 
6 
registration exemptions for certain organizations
31 and expanded the definition of a bank holding company 
to include long-term, non-business trusts, the 1966 Amendments did not require the registration of one-
bank holding companies. At the same time, the Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966 (“FIS Act”) 
repealed the voting permit requirement of the FR Act.
32 Therefore, one-bank holding companies not only 
remained outside the coverage of the BHC Act, they were also relieved of supervision by the Board 
attendant when obtaining a voting permit for member bank stock.  
From 1967 to 1969, the number of bank holding companies grew dramatically. At the end of 1968, 
existing or proposed one-bank holding companies controlled over 27% of the commercial bank deposits in 
FDIC-insured banks.
33 A Congressional staff report entitled The Growth of Unregistered Bank Holding 
Companies— Problems and Prospects provided a detailed account of the growing number of one-bank 
holding companies: 
 
[A] comparison can be made of the number and size of bank holding companies now 
under regulation of the Federal Reserve Board as against the number and size of existing 
and proposed one bank holding companies which under existing law would not come 
under regulation of the Federal Reserve Board. The contrast here is startling. The latest 
figures show that as of June 1968, 106 bank holding companies with $48.9 billion in 
bank deposits were registered with the Federal Reserve Board. In comparison, there were 
783 existing and proposed one bank holding companies with total commercial bank 
deposits of about $108.2 billion as of December 31, 1968, which would come under no 
regulation comparable to that imposed upon registered bank holding companies. In other 
words, more than 7 times as many bank holding companies, existing and proposed, with 
more than double the commercial bank deposits would evade Federal Reserve Bank 
regulation under existing law than are now regulated.
34 
 
So long as a company owned only one bank, it was not subject to supervision by the Board.  
                                                 
31 Id. § 13(b), 80 Stat. at 242 (1966); see also 52 Fed. Res. Bull. 963 (1955). 
32 Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-695, § 207, 80 Stat. 1055 (1966); see also 52 Fed. 
Res. Bull. 966 (1955) (repealing “the provisions . . . of the Federal Reserve Act, [and] requiring holding company 
affiliates to obtain permits to vote the stock of member banks”). 
33 S TAFF OF H. COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 91ST CONG., FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: REFORM AND THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST 1 (Comm. Print 1969).  
34 Id. at 7. 
 
7 
In 1969, legislation was introduced to expand the BHC Act definition of “bank holding company” to 
include one-bank holding companies.
35 On December 31, 1970, amendments to the BHC Act became law 
(“1970 Amendments”).
36 The 1970 Amendments required the registration of one-bank holding companies, 
eliminated the exemption for partnerships, and narrowed the exemptions for ownership in a fiduciary 
capacity, all of which increased the number of bank holding companies to which the BHC Act applied.  
 
5.  Termination of Nonbank Activities or Ownership 
 
In 1975, Senator William Proxmire introduced legislation to strengthen the supervisory authority of the 
federal banking agencies over domestic financial institutions.
37 In the Board’s letter recommending the 
legislation, Chairman Arthur Burns noted that the proposed bill included a “provision designed to aid the 
Board . . . in handling a problem bank situation where adverse effects have arisen from the relationship 
between the banking and nonbanking subsidiaries of the parent holding company” where the “problems 
and unfavorable publicity connected with a nonbanking subsidiary of a bank holding company” negatively 
impact banks within the bank holding company.
 38 Chairman Burns observed that this may lead to serious 
difficulties for such banks, which runs counter to the Board’s belief “that a bank holding company should 
be a source of financial strength for its subsidiary banks.”
39 Indeed, “nonbanking subsidiaries within a 
bank holding company structure should augment rather than detract from that strength.”
40 Thus, Chairman 
Burns stated that it was the Board’s belief that “it should have the power to order divestiture of a bank 
holding company subsidiary or termination of a nonbanking activity by a bank holding company whenever 
it has reasonable cause to believe that the continuation of such activity or ownership constitutes a serious 
risk to the financial safety, soundness, or stability of a bank holding company’s subsidiary bank[s].”
41 
Nevertheless, the Board recognized that the “power to order divestiture represents a drastic remedy and 
[the Board] contemplates that it would be exercised only in very rare instances. However, the Board’s 
experience to date leads it to believe that in some instances this remedy should be available in order 
                                                 
35 H.R. 6778, 91st Cong. (1969); H.R. 9385, 91st Cong. (1969) (“‘Bank holding company’ means any company that 
has control over any bank or over any company that is or becomes a bank holding company.”). 
36 Bank Holding Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, 84 Stat. 1760. 
37 S. 2304, 94th Cong. (1975). 
38 Bill to Strengthen Supervisory Authority of Banking Agencies Introduced in Senate, [1973-1978 Transfer Binder] 






effectively to protect the interests of a banking subsidiary of the bank holding company, its depositors, and 
customers.”
42 
In 1978, Congress authorized the Board to order the cessation of activities and divestiture of nonbank 
subsidiaries of a bank holding company under certain conditions through enactment of the Financial 
Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978 (“FIRIRCA”).
 43 FIRIRCA added section 
5(e) to the BHC Act, thus giving the Board the power to order a bank holding company to terminate any 
activity, ownership or control of any nonbank subsidiary (other than a nonbank subsidiary of a bank) if the 
Board has reasonable cause to believe that continuation of the activity, ownership or control constitutes a 
serious risk to the financial safety, soundness or stability of a bank subsidiary of the bank holding 
company.
 44 Such an order could be issued after due notice and opportunity for hearing, and after 
considering the views of the bank’s primary supervisor.
45 In addition, FIRIRCA gave the Board the power 
to issue a cease-and-desist order against a bank holding company or subsidiary thereof in connection with 
violations of law, regulation, agreement in writing and unsafe and unsound practices.
46 
 
6.  BHC Ratings and Capital 
 
In the late 1970s, federal banking regulators developed new systems for rating banks and bank holding 
companies. The CAMEL rating system was adopted for banks in 1978.
47 In 1979, the Board adopted the 
BOPEC/F-M rating system for bank holding companies.
48 In the BOPEC/F-M system, the components 
were defined as follows: “B” stood for “Bank Subsidiaries,” “O” stood for Other (Nonbank) Subsidiaries, 
“P” stood for “Parent Company,” “E” stood for “Earnings-Consolidated,” “C” stood for “Capital 
adequacy— Consolidated,” “F” stood for “Financial Composite Rating,” and “M” stood for “Management 
                                                 
42 Id. 
43 Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). In a study released during 1978, Board staff analyzed the 
financial and economic implications for the growth of bank holding companies. Compendium, supra note 2. 
44 E.g., Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act § 105(a); H.R. REP. No. 95-1383, at 19 
(1978) (“If the Federal Reserve . . . has cause to believe that the operation of a nondepository subsidiary is a serious 
risk . . . [it] can order the holding company to divest within 120 days such nondepository subsidiary.”). 
45 Id. 
46 Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act § 107(b). 
47 Banking Agencies Adopt Uniform Interagency Bank Soundness Rating System, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. 
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 97,451 (May 10, 1978) (stating that, in the CAMEL system “C” stands for “Capital,” “A” 
stands for “Asset quality,” “M” stands for “Management,” “E” stands for “Earnings,” and “L” stands for 
“Liquidity”). 
48 Federal Reserve Board Adopts System for Appraising and Rating Performance and Financial Condition of Bank 
Holding Companies, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 97,708 (Feb. 7, 1979) (evaluating 
bank holding companies by examining “Bank Subsidiaries; Other (Nonbank) Subsidiaries; Parent Company; 




49 In adopting the BOPEC/F-M rating system, the Board noted that its concern was 
with the “risk characteristics of the entire organization,”
50 as well as the need for “capital on a consolidated 
basis that must serve as the ultimate source of support and strength to the entire corporation.”
51  
Before the 1980s, bank regulators enforced capital requirements informally.
52 In 1981, the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) and Board issued formal capital standards.
53 In 1983, the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals overturned an OCC capital directive related to the unsafe and unsound capital 
level at a national bank.
54 Congress reacted to the decision by enacting the International Lending 
Supervision Act (“ILS Act”).
55 The ILS Act directed federal banking agencies to “cause banking 
institutions to achieve and maintain adequate capital by establishing minimum levels of capital for such 
banking institutions.”
56 The ILS Act clearly established the authority of regulators to issue capital 
directives and to utilize capital ratios as a determinant of safety and soundness. Specifically, the ILS Act 
stated that the “failure of a banking institution to maintain capital at or above its minimum level . . . may 
be deemed . . . to constitute an unsafe and unsound practice.”
57 Furthermore, the ILS Act provided the 
Board with authority to establish capital standards for affiliates, including bank holding companies and 
their nonbank subsidiaries.
58 
Regulatory capital requirements continued to evolve after the ILS Act. In 1985, the federal banking 
regulators adopted uniform capital adequacy standards.
59 In January 1989, the Board adopted risk-based 
                                                 
49 The first five elements are rated on a scale of one through five in descending order of performance quality. The 
financial composite rating denotes an overall evaluation ratings based on the first five elements. The managerial 
composite reflects a comprehensive evaluation of holding company management as indicated by the assignment of 
“S”, “F”, or “U” for, respectively, management that is found to be satisfactory, fair or unsatisfactory. Id. at 2. 
50 Id.  
51 Id. at 10. 
52  See, e.g., Kenneth J. Gordon, Risk-Based Capital Requirements: The Proper Approach to Safe and Sound 
Banking?, 10  ANN.  REV.  BANKING  LAW 491, 493 (1991); Joseph J. Norton, Capital Adequacy Standards: A 
Legitimate Regulatory Concern for Prudential Supervision of Banking Activities?, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1299, 1321 
(1989) (“The various regulatory positions were largely separate internal examination tools for helping to assess 
overall bank soundness and to coax informally management (where needed) to do better.”). 
53 E.g., Statement of Policy on Capital Adequacy, 46 Fed. Reg. 62,693 (FDIC 1981); Capital Adequacy Guidelines, 
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 47-255, at 9 (Dec. 17, 1981). 
54 First Nat’l Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of the Currency, 697 F.2d 674, 685 (5th Cir. 1983). 
55 International Lending Supervision Act , Pub. L. No. 98-181, 97 Stat. 1278 (1983); see also 12 U.S.C. § 3907 
(1983). 
56 International Lending Supervision Act, § 908, 97 Stat. at 1280 (1983). 
57 Id. 
58 S. REP. No. 98-122, at 17 (1983) (“[A]ny of the provisions of the bill may be applied by the appropriate federal 
banking agency to any affiliate of any insured bank, including any bank holding company individually or on a 
consolidated basis for its nonbank subsidiaries . . . .”.); see also S. REP. No. 100-19, at 36 (1987); 50 Fed. Reg. 
16,057, 16,064 (Federal Reserve Bd. Apr. 24, 1985); Wake Bancorp, Inc., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 925 (1987). 
59 See, e.g., 50 Fed. Reg. 16,057, 16,066 (Federal Reserve Bd. Apr. 24, 1985); 50 Fed. Reg. 11,128, 11,136 (FDIC 




60 These guidelines reinforced the existing policy that organizations undertaking 
significant expansion, either through internal growth or acquisitions, maintain strong capital positions 
substantially above minimum levels. In August 1989, the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and 
Enforcement Act of 1989
61 mandated penalties for failure to satisfy capital standards on a timely basis. In 
December 1991, the Federal Deposit Insurance Improvement Act of 1991 required bank regulators to 
monitor capital levels and take prompt corrective action when insured depository institutions failed to 
meet them, basing the required actions upon five delineated capital categories.
62 
 
7.  Proposals to Reform the Regulatory Structure 
 
Proposals to reform the regulatory structure for financial institutions are an almost perennial feature of 
political debate.
63 During the late 1980s and early 1990s, many reform proposals advocated simplifying 
the regulatory structure for financial institutions. In 1987, Senator Wirth co-sponsored legislation to 
establish a Financial Services Oversight Commission
64 with responsibility for consolidated supervision o
domestic financial institutions by function rather than type of institution. Senator Wirth stated that the 
proposed Commission “would provide an umbrella supervisory structure,” and would have powers to 
“regulate activities of banking, financial and commercial holding companies and establish minimum 




                                                
In the first quarter of 1991, Representative Gonzalez introduced two separate banking bills, House Bill 6
66 
and House Bill 1505.
67 These bills included provisions reforming the deposit insurance system, mandating 
prompt corrective action, regulating foreign banks operating in the United States, amending consumer 
protection laws and modernizing financial services regulation and supervision. House Bill 6 would have 
reorganized the supervisory structure for banks and thrifts, splitting federal supervision and regulation of 
 
60 54 Fed. Reg. 4186 (Federal Reserve Bd. Jan. 27, 1989). 
61 Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183. 
62 See Federal Deposit Insurance Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 131, 105 Stat. 2236, 2253 
(1991). 
63 For an overview of 24 proposals for regulatory restructuring going back to the 1930s, see the Appendix to Rose 
Marie Kushmeider, The U.S. Federal Financial Regulatory System: Restructuring Federal Bank Regulation, 17 
FDIC BANKING R EVIEW 1, 25-29 (2005); see also, DEPT. OF THE TREASURY,  BLUEPRINT FOR MODERNIZED 
FINANCIAL REGULATORY STUCTURE (2008). 
64 S. 1891, 100th Cong. (1987). The bill was based in large part on a proposal by E. Gerald Corrigan, president of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. E. GERALD CORRIGAN, FINANCIAL MARKET STRUCTURE: A LONGER VIEW 
(Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.1987). 
65 S. 2433, 101st Cong. (1990); S. 1891, 100th Cong. (1987) (emphasis added); 136 CONG. REC. S4246 (1990); 133 
CONG. REC. S16675 (1987). 
66 H.R. 6, 102d Cong. (1991). 
67 H.R. 1505, 102d Cong. (1991). 
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bank holding companies, banks, and thrifts between the Board and a new Office of Depository Institutions 
Supervision.
68 House Bill 1505 would have created one federal regulator for bank holding companies, 
banks, and thrifts by transferring the supervisory powers of the OCC, Board, FDIC, and Office of Thrift 
Supervision (“OTS”) to a new Federal Depository Institutions Regulatory Agency.
69  
In February 1991, the Treasury advanced a proposal to restructure the regulatory system for financial 
institutions that would have allocated bank and bank holding company “umbrella oversight” to a new 
federal banking agency or the Board, depending upon the national or state charter of the lead bank within 
the organization.
70 The Treasury report addressed “umbrella oversight” of a financial services holding 
company (“FSHC”), observing that “bank regulation should be focused on protecting the bank, which has 
access to the federal safety net, not on protecting its holding company or financial affiliates.”
 71 But some 
umbrella oversight is necessary:
72 “Umbrella oversight is designed to identify problems in the holding 
company of affiliates that are likely to cause difficulties for the insured bank, and to apply remedial action. 
The sole, guiding principle of umbrella oversight is to protect the insured bank.”
73 Such oversight 
includes:  
 
[A] The ability to examine the FSHC and bank, and also to examine any nonbank affiliate 
which poses a risk to the bank. (The regulator, if any, of the nonbank affiliate would have 
reciprocal examination rights.) [B] The ability to require sale of a nonbank affiliate if 
such affiliate poses a clear threat to the bank. [C] For banks that fall below minimum 
capital standards, the ability to require that the parent company either: (1) bring bank 
capital back to minimum standards; (2) sell or otherwise divest the bank; or (3) become 
subject to bank capital standards and other holding company regulations to be applied to 
the entire organization on a consolidated basis.
74 
 
As reported by the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, House Bill 6 required 
diversified holding companies to register with the Board, and gave the Board the power to require reports 
from diversified holding companies and their subsidiaries, as well as authority to conduct examinations of 
                                                 
68 See H.R. 6, Title X, 102d Cong. (1991). 
69 See H.R. 1505, Title III, 102d Cong. (1991). 
70 See DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SAFER, MORE 
COMPETITIVE BANKS (1991) [hereinafter Financial System]. 
71 Id.at 61. 
72 Id. (“At the same time, certain ‘umbrella oversight’ of the FSHC by the bank regulator is necessary to protect the 
insured depository from affiliate risk.”) 
73 Id. (emphasis added). 
74 Id.  
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the holding companies and their financial affiliates.
75 This bill gave the Board supervisory authority over 
holding companies rather than distributing supervision of holding companies between two regulators as 
proposed by the Treasury Department.  
In October 1991, Representative Dingell used the term “umbrella regulator” to describe the Board’s role in 
the system of regulation envisioned by House Bill 6—a system of functional regulation for banking and 
securities activities, which preserved the Federal Reserve’s role as “umbrella regulator” of domestic bank 
holding companies.
76 Representative Dingell stated that such a system “requires tough, functional 
regulation of new securities powers by giving the securities regulators control over the securities activities 
of banks, and it preserves to the Federal Reserve Board its current role of an umbrella regulator of the 
holding company.”
77 
While House Bill 6 did not pass the House, several of the matters addressed by the bill appeared in the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (“FDICIA”).
78 FDICIA made a number 
of changes related to deposit insurance, supervision of foreign banks, prompt corrective action when 
institutions fell below certain capital thresholds, audit committees, and accounting standards. However, 




8.  Risk-Based Supervisory Practices 
 
In the late 1980s, the supervisory practices of international and domestic regulators became increasingly 
risk-focused. In January 1987, the United States and United Kingdom reached a nonbinding accord on 
capital adequacy standards, which sought to promote uniformity and a risk-based approach to capital 
adequacy.
80 In 1988, the Basel Committee issued its final capital adequacy report (“Basel Capital 
Accord”).
81 In 1989, federal banking regulators adopted risk-based capital standards based on the Basel 
                                                 
75 H.R. 6, § 405, 102d Cong. (1991); H.R. REP. No. 102-157, at 69 (1991).  
76 See 137 CONG. REC. H8899 (1991); see also Financial Institutions Safety and Consumer Choice Act of 1991, 
H.R. 6 §§ 404, 405, 102d Cong. (1991) (proposed registration, reporting, examination, and enforcement powers of 
the Board). 
77 137 CONG. REC. H8899 (1991). 
78 See Federal Deposit Insurance Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991). 
79 See id. 
80 See 52 Fed. Reg. 5119, 5135 (Feb. 19, 1987). 
81 B ASLE  COMM. ON BANKING  SUPERVISION,  INTERNATIONAL  CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL  MEASUREMENT AND 




 82 The Board’s risk-based capital requirements classified capital as core capital and 
supplementary capital, requiring at least 50% of capital to consist of core capital. The risk-based 
requirements also categorized assets and off-balance sheet risk to arrive at a weighed risk figure. Capital 
was then divided by the weighted risk figure to yield a risk-based capital ratio. The risk-based system 
required a certain percentage of capital to be set aside depending upon the level of risk involved with 
particular assets. 
Supervisory focus on risk impacted other areas of supervisory practice. In 1996, Federal Reserve 
examiners began to assign a formal supervisory rating to the adequacy of an institution’s risk-management 
processes, including its internal controls.
83 Large institutions were expected to have comprehensive 
reporting and monitoring systems that allowed for “the aggregation of risks on a fully consolidated basis 
across all business lines and activities.”
84 In 1997, Board staff issued an SR letter entitled Risk-Focused 
Framework for Supervision of Large Complex Institutions.
85 This guidance focused on activities that pose 
the greatest risks to the soundness of a banking organization and assessment of an organization’s 
management systems to identify, measure, monitor and control risks. This guidance also referred to the 
umbrella supervision responsibilities of the Board, stating that, when the Board carries out its “umbrella 
supervision responsibilities for bank holding companies and the U.S. operations of foreign banking 
organizations, the Federal Reserve should continue, as appropriate, to incorporate the findings and 
conclusions of other supervisors into its overall assessment of the consolidated banking organization or 
banking group.”
86 The Board’s role as an umbrella supervisor was supported by its risk-based practices 
related to consolidated capital and risk-management processes, which cut across legal entities under 
ownership or control of a bank holding company. 
 
                                                 
82 See, e.g., 54 Fed. Reg. 4186, 4191 (Fed. Reserve Jan. 27, 1989); 53 Fed. Reg. 8550, 8558 (Fed. Reserve Mar. 15, 
1988). 
83 See Fed. Reserve Bd., SR 95-51, Rating the Adequacy of Risk Management Processes and Internal Controls at 
State Member Banks and Bank Holding Companies (Nov. 14, 1995).  
84 Id. at 9. 
85 See Fed. Reserve Bd., SR 97-24, Risk-Focused Framework for Supervision of Large Complex Institutions (Oct. 
27, 1997). 
86 Id. at 2 (emphasis added). Board staff also referred to the Board’s “umbrella authority” in connection with 
guidance issued in 1995 regarding supervision of foreign banks with U.S. operations: “The Federal Reserve, in its 
statutory role as umbrella authority with responsibility for overall U.S. operations, will confer with the examining 
agencies to determine if its participation in any of the examiner closeout meetings is warranted.” Fed. Reserve Bd., 
SR 95-22, Enhanced Framework for Supervising the U.S. Operations of Foreign Banking Organizations (March 31, 
1995) (emphasis added).  
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9.  Legislative Proposals During the Late 1990s 
 
  On February 27, 1995, Representative Leach introduced House Bill 1062, which expand 
permissible affiliations between banks and securities firms.
87 In testimony on this legislation, Chairman 
Greenspan discussed the Board’s supervisory role over domestic institutions in Congressional testimony, 
stating, “[W]e must not lose sight, and the Leach bill does not, that the umbrella supervisor must still be 
permitted to monitor both the financial condition of the organization and the potential transfer of risks to 
the insured depository affiliates.”
88 Subsequent congressional witnesses also addressed the importance of 
umbrella, comprehensive, and consolidated supervision of domestic financial institutions.
89 Nevertheless, 
the 104
th Congress ended without action on this legislation by the full House. On January 7, 1997, 
Representative Leach introduced House Bill 10. It authorized financial services holding companies and 
affiliations between banking, securities, and insurance firms. The bill also authorized the Board to gather 
information on the financial services holding companies and any subsidiary through reports and 
examinations.
90 On July 3, 1997, the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services voted favorably 
on House Bill 10 and issued a report that addressed umbrella supervision, noting that “[a]n important 
aspect of this new framework is that it would incorporate functional regulation with the Federal Reserve 
serving as an umbrella regulator to oversee the new financial holding company structure.
91 On October 30, 
1997, the House Commerce Committee adopted an amendment to House Bill 10 that reduced the Board’s 
oversight authority.
92 On November 3, 1997, a report by the House Committee on Banking and Financial 
Services, in discussing provisions designed to streamline Board supervision of bank holding companies, 
stated that such provisions make “significant changes in the role of the Federal Reserve Board in 
overseeing holding companies.”
93 Specifically, “Section 111 provides that the Federal Reserve Board may 
not examine the non-bank subsidiaries of financial services holding companies, absent exigent 
                                                 
87 H.R. 1062, 104th Cong. (1995). 
88 Modernization of the Financial Services Regulatory Systems: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Banking & Fin. 
Servs., 104th Cong. 10 (1995) (testimony of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd.) (emphasis added). 
89 See, e.g., Modernization of the Financial Services Regulatory Systems: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Banking 
& Fin. Servs., 104th Cong. (1995) (testimony of Matthew P. Fink, President, Investment Company Institute); 
Modernization of the Financial Services Regulatory Systems: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Banking & Fin. 
Servs., 104th Cong. (1995) (testimony of James L. Bothwell, Dir., Fin. Inst. And Mkt. Issues, U.S. Gen. Accounting 
Office); Modernization of the Financial Services Regulatory Systems: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Banking & 
Fin. Servs., 104th Cong. (1995) (testimony of Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, James D. Wolfensohn, Inc. and Frederick 
H. Schultz Professor of International Economic Policy of Princeton University.); Modernization of the Financial 
Services Regulatory Systems: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Banking & Fin. Servs., 104th Cong. (1995) 
(testimony of E. Gerald Corrigan). 
90 H.R. 10, 105th Cong. §§ 101, 102, 123 (1997). 
91 H.R. REP. No. 105-164, pt. 1, at 90 (1997). 
92 See Press Release, Conference of State Bank Supervisors, Financial Modernization Legislation Passes House 
Commerce Committee (Oct. 31, 1997). 
93 H.R. REP. No. 105-164, pt. 3, at 117 (1997). 
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circumstances. The Committee determined that although it was appropriate for the Federal Reserve Board 
to have supervisory authority over holding companies, the authority over affiliates should be confined to 
the functional regulators. . . .”
94 
As amended, the bill required the Board to use reports of primary bank regulators, functional regulators, 
and self-regulatory organizations to the fullest extent possible, limited the Board’s authority to examine 
functionally regulated subsidiaries, and prohibited the Board from imposing capital requirements on 
functionally regulated holding company subsidiaries.  
On May 13, 1998, Representative Gillmor made the following statement on the floor of the House 
regarding these provisions: 
 
Earlier versions of this legislation would have created an umbrella-like regulatory 
framework subjecting many financial entities to excessive and conflicting regulatory 
requirements. No clear argument had been made to authorize Federal Reserve umbrella 
regulation over securities and insurance entities that had functioned effectively without 
Federal Reserve supervision. That is why I offered an amendment in the Committee on 
Commerce to scale back this broad expansion of unwarranted regulatory authority and 
emphasize true functional regulation. My amendment, which was passed unanimously in 
the Committee on Commerce, is commonly known as Fed Lite because it scales back 
much of the unnecessary authority of the Federal Reserve to require reports and conduct 
examinations in nonbank subsidiaries of a holding company. Essentially, Fed Lite 
eliminates most duplicative and burdensome regulations.
95 
 
While the Fed Lite provisions minimized burden and reduced duplication, they affirmed the Board’s 
capital adequacy practices and strengthened the Board’s authority to set capital standards for affiliates, 
albeit with limitations related to functionally regulated insurance, securities, and commodities affiliates.
96  
As passed by the House on May 13, 1998, the bill referred to the Board as the “umbrella supervisor” of 
financial holding companies in a purpose section related to interagency coordination, consultation, and 
information sharing. The language in that section stated that Congress’s intent was “that the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, as the umbrella supervisor for financial holding companies, and 
the State insurance regulators, as the functional regulators of companies engaged in insurance activities, 
                                                 
94 Id. 
95 144 CONG. REC. H3130 (daily ed. May 13, 1998) (statement of Rep. Gillmor). 
96 H.R. REP. No. 105-164, pt. 3, at 13 (1997). 
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coordinate efforts to supervise companies that control both a depository institution and a company engaged 
in insurance activities regulated under State law.”
97 This was the first use of the term “umbrella” in the text 
of proposed legislation to refer to the Board’s supervisory role.  
On September 18, 1998, the bill reported out of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs included similar provisions regarding streamlined supervision of financial holding companies.
98 
However, the 105th Congress ended without further action on this banking legislation in large part because 
of objection to its expansion of the Community Reinvestment Act.
99 On January 6, 1999, House Bill 10 
was reintroduced in the House. It included provisions similar to the Senate bill worked on during the 
previous year.
100 Committee Chairman James Leach stated that “last fall we came close to achieving 
consensus and the bill before us reflects compromises hammered out over four years of consideration.”
101 
On March 4, 1999, the Senate Banking Committee completed its mark-up of the Senate’s version of 
financial services modernization, Senate Bill 900. Prior to the committee vote, Senator Sarbanes and 
Representative Leach resolved a number of issues, including differences over the Community 
Reinvestment Act.
102 The report of the committee commented on the supervision of financial holding 
companies, stating that the bill “seeks to provide regulation of BHCs that is sufficient to protect the safety 
and soundness of the financial system and the integrity of the Federal deposit insurance funds without 
imposing unnecessary regulatory burdens.”
103 The report further observed that “[w]hile functional 
regulators are supervising various holding company subsidiaries, the Committee believes there is a need 
for oversight of the organization as a whole as well as subsidiaries not subject to functional regulation. The 
need for holding company regulation was stressed by witnesses before the Committee as well.”
104 The 
report thus concluded that “the Board has authority to examine the holding company and, under certain 
circumstances, any holding company subsidiary that poses a material risk to an affiliated bank.” 
Nevertheless, such umbrella regulation had its limits:  
 
                                                 
97 H.R. 10, 105th Cong. § 117 (1998). 
98 S. 2590, 105th Cong. § 117 (1998); S. REP. NO. 105-336, at 12 (1998). 
99 Financial Modernization Runs Out of Stream, 17 BANKING POL’Y REP. 2 (1998). 
100 H.R. 10, 106th Cong. §§ 111, 117 (1999). 
101 Modernization of the Financial Services Regulatory Systems: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Banking & Fin. 
Servs., 104th Cong. 1 (1995) (statement of Rep. Leach, Chairman, House Comm. on Banking & Fin. Servs.).  
102  Financial Modernization: Just Before March 4 Vote, Lawmakers Compromise on Controversial Issues, 18 
BANKING POL’Y REP. 3, (1999).  
103 S. REP. NO. 106-44, at 16 (1999). 
104 Id. (“For example, William McQuillan, President of City National Bank of Greeley, N.E., testified, ‘the IBAA 
strongly supports the establishment of an umbrella regulator for diversified financial services firms and feels the 
only Federal regulator equipped for this job is the Federal Reserve.’”). 
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The Committee does not intend for holding company regulation to override functional 
regulation of holding company subsidiaries. For functionally regulated subsidiaries, the 
Board is required, to the greatest extent possible, to rely on reports required by and 
examinations conducted by the functional regulator.
105 
 
The Senate passed Senate Bill 900 on March 6, 1999. 
On March 11, 1999, the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services completed its mark-up of 
House Bill 10. The Committee version of the bill continued to state congressional intention regarding 
coordination, consultation, and information sharing between the Board as umbrella supervisor and state 
insurance regulators.
106 The Committee’s report provided further explanation of the supervisory approach 
of the bill: 
 
The framework for permitting new financial affiliations incorporates functional 
regulation with the Federal Reserve serving as an umbrella supervisor to oversee the new 
financial holding company structure. The Federal Reserve would be required to defer to 
the Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC] and state regulators on interpretation of 
state securities laws and to state insurance regulators on interpretation of state insurance 
law as it relates to functionally-regulated nonbank affiliates.
107 
  
These provisions remained in the bill as reported by the House Commerce Committee on June 15, 1999.
108 
The Committee report provided the following explanation of the supervision of financial holding 
companies by the Board, the SEC, and state insurance regulators: 
 
[Section 111] clarifies and limits the role of the Federal Reserve Board in overseeing 
holding companies . . . . Section 111 provides that the Federal Reserve Board may 
examine the non-bank subsidiaries of financial services holding companies only under 
specified and limited circumstances. . . .  
 
Section 111 also provides that the Federal Reserve Board may not impose any capital 
adequacy rules, guidelines or other actions on a non-depository subsidiary of a bank 
                                                 
105 Id. 
106 H. REP. NO. 106-74, pt. 1, at 26 (1999). 
107 Id. at 98. 
108 H. REP. NO. 106-74, pt. 3, at 19, 77 (1999). 
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holding company that is in compliance with the applicable capital requirements of 
another Federal regulatory authority or State insurance authority. . . .  
 
This section also requires the Federal Reserve Board to defer to the SEC regarding the 
interpretation and enforcement of applicable Federal securities laws . . . [and] to the 
relevant State insurance authorities regarding the interpretation and enforcement of 




The House passed House Bill 10 on July 1, 1999.  
Although there were significant differences in the bills passed by the House and Senate, both bills 
acknowledged the Board as the umbrella supervisor for financial holding companies engaged in bank, 
insurance, and securities activities. The differences between the two bills was worked out by the 
Conference Committee, which issued its report on November 2, 1999.
110 The Conference Report stated: 
 
Reflected in the legislation is the determination made by both Houses to preserve the role 
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System . . . as the umbrella supervisor 
for holding companies, but to incorporate a system of functional regulation designed to 
utilize the strengths of the various Federal and State financial supervisors. . . .  
 
In keeping with the Board’s role as an umbrella supervisor, the legislation provides that 
the Board may require any bank holding company or subsidiary thereof to submit reports 
regarding its financial condition, systems for monitoring and controlling financial and 
operating risks, transactions with depository institutions, and compliance with the BHCA 
or other Federal laws that the Board has specific jurisdiction to enforce. The Board is 
directed to use existing examination reports prepared by other regulators, publicly 




                                                 
109 Id. at 143-45. 
110 Resolution of the differences between the bills was facilitated by an agreement between the Federal Reserve 
Board and the Treasury on the activities of operating subsidiaries. Letter from Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the 
Fed. Res. Bd. and Lawrence H. Summers, Sec’y of the Treasury, to Jim Leach, Representative, Chairman of the 
House Comm. on Banking & Fin. Servs. (Oct. 14, 1999). 
111 H. REP. NO. 106-434, at 151-57 (1999). 
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On November 4, 1999, Representative Gillmor made the following statements about umbrella supervision 
in Congressional debate related to acceptance of the Conference Report: 
 
While the Federal Reserve serves an umbrella regulator over Financial Holding 
Companies, I was concerned about the Fed getting into the jurisdiction of the already 
effective insurance and securities regulators . . . . My amendment in the Commerce 
Committee two years ago, which was included in the current bill, created the functional 
regulatory framework for financial holding companies. The purpose of this “Fed Lite” 
framework is to parallel the financial services affiliate structure envisioned under this 
legislation. This parallel regulatory structure eliminates the duplicative and burdensome 
regulations on businesses not engaged in banking activities, and importantly, preserves 
the role of the Federal Reserve as the prudential supervisor over businesses that have 
access to taxpayer guarantees and the federal safety net.
112 
 
On November 4, 1999, the Senate and House agreed to the Conference Report.
113  
 
B.  Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act  
1.  Major Provisions 
 
On November 12, 1999, President Clinton signed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB Act) into law.
114 
The GLB Act repealed restrictions on affiliations among banks, securities firms, insurance companies, a
other financial services providers contained in the Banking Act and BHC Act.
nd 
                                                
115 It also authorized 
affiliations among such entities through the creation of a new financial holding company structure.  
  Functional and Entity Regulation. The GLB Act accepted functional regulation—regulation of 
banking activities by bank regulators, regulation of securities activities by the SEC, regulation of insurance 
activities by state insurance commissions, and regulation of commodities activities by the Commodities 
Futures Trading Commission. The GLB Act supplemented functional regulation with entity regulation, 
 
112 145 CONG. REC. H11547-11548 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1999) (statement of Rep. Gillmor); see also 145 CONG. REC. 
S13877 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1999) (statement of Sen. Allard); 145 CONG. REC. S4616 (daily ed. May 4, 1999) 
(statement of Sen. Gramm). 
113 145 CONG. REC. D1257 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1999). 
114 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified at scattered sections of 
12 U.S.C.); see also, President Bill Clinton, Remarks at the Signing of the Financial Modernization Act (Nov. 12, 
1999), in 35 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2363 (Nov. 12, 1999). 
115 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act §§ 101, 102. 
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however, leaving intact the Board’s general power to supervise the parent entity over subsidiaries offering 
banking, securities, insurance, and other financial services, subject to certain limitations.  
 FHC  Status. The GLB Act authorized a bank holding company that files an effective election with 
the Board certifying that all of its depository institution subsidiaries are well capitalized and well managed 
to become a financial holding company (“FHC”). FHCs may engage in a broad range of activities that are 
financial in nature, including securities underwriting and dealing, insurance agency and underwriting, and 
merchant banking, as well as activities deemed to be incidental or complementary to such financial 
activities.
116  
 Supervisory  Authority. Under the GLB Act, the Board continued to have the power to examine 
and require reports from any bank holding company or any subsidiary, adopt consolidated capital 
adequacy guidelines for bank holding companies, and take enforcement action against bank holding 
companies and their nonbank subsidiaries. Furthermore, the GLB Act acknowledged the Board as the 
“umbrella supervisor” in connection with the Board’s relationship with functional regulators of insurance 
companies: 
 
It is the intention of the Congress that the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, as the umbrella supervisor for financial holding companies, and the State 
insurance regulators, as the functional regulators of companies engaged in insurance 
activities, coordinate efforts to supervise companies that control both a depository 
institution and a company engaged in insurance activities regulated under State law.
117 
 
The GLB Act also addressed information sharing by the Board, other federal banking agencies, and state 
insurance regulators. But the GLB Act placed limits on the Board’s supervisory powers, especially for 
functionally regulated subsidiaries of a bank holding company.
118 
 Reports. The GLB Act required the Board to rely on publicly available information, externally 
audited financial statements and reports that a holding company or subsidiary is required to provide to 
                                                 
116 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k) (2008); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 103. 
117 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 307. This is the only statutory use of the term “umbrella supervisor.” 
118 A “functionally regulated subsidiary” is defined to mean any subsidiary of a bank holding company (other than 
an insured depository institution) that is a broker, dealer, or investment company registered with the SEC; insurance 
company, insurance agent supervised by a state insurance regulator, investment adviser supervised by the SEC or 
state securities supervisor; or entity regulated by the Commodities Futures Trading Commission. 12 U.S.C. § 
1844(c)(5); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 111. 
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other federal or state supervisors or self-regulatory organizations to the fullest extent possible.
119 Before 
the Board may seek a special report from a functionally regulated subsidiary, the Board must first request 
that the subsidiary’s functional regulator obtain the special report.
120 If the report is not made available to 
the Board, the Board may obtain the report directly from the subsidiary only if the report is necessary to 
assess: (a) a material risk to the holding company or an affiliated depository institution; (b) compliance 
with the BHC Act or any other federal law that the Board has specific jurisdiction to enforce against the 
company or subsidiary; or (c) the holding company’s systems for managing and controlling financial or 
operational risks that may pose a threat to a subsidiary insured depository institution.
121 
 Examinations. The Board may examine a bank holding company or any subsidiary only for 
specified purposes, and must focus its examinations on the holding company and any subsidiary that, for 
specified reasons, may have a material adverse effect on affiliated depository institutions.
122 The Board 
must, to the fullest extent possible, rely on reports of examination done by the functional regulator of an 
insurance company, a securities broker or dealer, or any other functionally regulated subsidiary.
123 In 
addition, the Board may examine a functionally regulated subsidiary only if the Board: (1) reasonably 
believes that the subsidiary is engaged in activities that pose a material risk to an affiliated depository 
institution; (2) reasonably determines that examination of the subsidiary is necessary to adequately inform 
the Board concerning the holding company’s systems for monitoring and controlling financial and 
operational risks that could threaten a subsidiary depository institution; or (3) has reasonable cause to 
believe that the subsidiary is not in compliance with the BHC Act or any other federal law that the Board 
has specific jurisdiction to enforce against the subsidiary (including applicable limitations on transactions 
between a depository institution and its affiliates) and the Board cannot otherwise determine such 
compliance through the examination of the holding company or its subsidiary depository institutions.
124 
  Capital. The Board retained its authority to adopt consolidated capital adequacy guidelines for 
bank holding companies,
125 but the Board may not impose capital requirements on: (a) any securities 
broker-dealer or insurance company subsidiary in compliance with the capital requirements of the 
Securities Exchange Commission or relevant state insurance authority; (b) any other subsidiary in 
                                                 
119 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(1)(B)(i); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 111. 
120 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(1)(B)(iii)(I); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 111. 
121 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(1)(B)(iii)(II); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 111. 
122 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(2); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 111. 
123 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(2)(E); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 111. 
124 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(2)(B); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 111. 
125 12 U.S.C. § 3907. 
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compliance with the applicable capital requirements of its federal regulator; or (c) any registered 
investment adviser or licensed insurance agent subsidiary.
126 
  Source of Strength. Under existing regulation, the Board requires a bank holding company to serve 
as a source of strength to its subsidiary banks.
127 But Congress limited this policy by prohibiting the Board 
from requiring a subsidiary of a bank holding company that is a insurance company, registered broker-
dealer, investment company, or investment adviser to provide funds or assets to an affiliated depository 
institution if the state insurance authority or the SEC, as appropriate, determine that the transfer would 
have a material adverse effect on the financial condition of such subsidiary.
128 In such circumstances, 
however, the Board could order the bank holding company to divest the relevant depository institution.
129 
  Enforcement. The GLB Act impacted the Board’s enforcement authority in several ways. First, the 
Board can order the divestiture of a depository institution by a broker-dealer or insurance company under 
the conditions stated immediately above. Second, the GLB Act authorized the Board to order the divesture 
of depository institution subsidiaries of a FHC if the FHC does not cause any depository institution 
subsidiary of the FHC not in compliance with applicable FHC capital and management requirements to 
cure such deficiencies within specified time frames.
130 Finally, the GLB Act limited the Board's 
enforcement authority regarding functionally regulated subsidiaries. The Board may take enforcement 
action against such functionally regulated subsidiaries only: (a) to enforce compliance with any federal law 
                                                 
126 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 111(5)(c)(3)(A). In establishing capital adequacy guidelines, the Board may not take 
into account the operations or investments of any investment company that is registered under the Investment 
Company Act of 1940, unless (i) the investment company is a bank holding company, or (ii) a bank holding 
company owns at least 25 percent of the investment company and such investment has a market value of at least 
$1 million.  Id. § 111(5)(c)(3)(C). The Conference Report indicates that the Board should be flexible in its 
application of holding company consolidated capital standards to FHCs of which the predominant 
regulated subsidiary is a broker-dealer. 145 CONG. REC. H11295 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1999). 
127 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(1) (2008); 52 Fed. Reg. 15,707 (Apr. 30, 1987). But see MCorp Fin., Inc. v. Bd. of 
Governors Fed. Reserve Sys., 900 F.2d 852, 863 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that the BHC Act does not require a 
holding company to transfer its funds to its troubled subsidiary). But the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Fifth 
Circuit, holding that the court of appeals did not have the jurisdiction to set aside the Board’s order. Bd. of 
Governors Fed. Reserve Sys. v. MCorp Fin., Inc., 502 U.S. 32, 44 (1991). While the Supreme Court did not rule on 
the issue, the Board argued that the ILS Act authorizes the Board to establish capital standards for bank holding 
companies and ensure that capital reserves are used to protect the safety of subsidiary banks. Brief of Petitioner-
Appellant at 19 n.23, Board of Governors, 502 U.S. 32 (1991) (Nos. 90-913 and 90-914). Subsequently, Congress 
enacted FDICIA, which granted federal regulators the ability to require a capital restoration plan guaranteed by the 
bank’s parent bank holding company. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 
102-242, § 131, 105 Stat. 2256; see also Kieran H. Fallon, Source of Strength or Source of Weakness?: A Critique of 
the “Source of Strength” Doctrine in Banking Reform, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344 (1991). 
128Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 112 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1831v and 1844(g)). 
129 Id. 
130 A noncompliant financial holding company may, however, avoid such a divestiture order by ceasing to engage in 
all activities that are not permissible for a bank holding company under section 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act. Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act, § 103 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1844(m)). 
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that the Board has specific jurisdiction to enforce (e.g., the BHC Act), or (b) to prevent or redress an 
unsafe or unsound practice or breach of fiduciary duty that poses a material risk to the financial safety, 
soundness, or stability of an affiliated depository institution or the domestic or international payments 
system, where the Board finds that it cannot effectively address the problem by taking action against only 
affiliated depository institutions.
131 
 Consultation. The GLB Act requires the Board to consult with the appropriate state insurance 
authorities prior to authorizing a financial holding company or insured depository institution to affiliate 
with a company engaged in insurance activities.
132 
  Information Sharing. The GLB Act authorizes the Board to provide information to the appropriate 
state insurance authority where necessary or appropriate to permit the state authority to administer and 
enforce state insurance laws.
133 It also authorizes the Board to provide any examination reports or other 
confidential supervisory information about any entities the Board has examined to any federal or state 
agency with supervisory or regulatory authority over that entity.
134 This authority allows the Board to 
share information with functional regulators who possess supervisory or regulatory authority over a 
holding company subsidiary or other such examined entities.  
                                                
 
2.  Commentary on GLB Act 
 
After enactment of the GLB Act, various bank regulators commented on the Board’s role as umbrella 
supervisor in public speeches. For instance, former Chairman Greenspan made the following statement a 
few days after the GLB Act became law: 
 
[T]he Federal Reserve retains the overall responsibility for financial services holding 
companies with bank subsidiaries. In exercising that responsibility, however, the Board is 
required by the act to rely, to the fullest extent possible, on public information and reports 
from, as well as examinations conducted by, the functional regulator. . . .  
 
It is clear from the letter and the spirit of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act that bank 
regulators and the holding company supervisor are to give great deference to the 
functional regulators and to interject themselves only in critical circumstances. . . . 
 
131 Id. § 113. 
132 Id. § 307(c). 
133 Id. § 307(b). 




[T]he new act does not change the key, dominant, and major responsibility of both the 
bank and the holding company regulators: to contribute to the safety and soundness of the 
insured depository institution. . . .  
 
In order to protect the bank, umbrella supervision must extend its oversight to the 
consolidated organization. The need for the Federal Reserve to take a consolidated view 
of entities with bank affiliates represents the reality that current and future bank holding 
companies are not passive portfolio investors in their component parts, but rather 
managers of a consolidated financial enterprise directed from the center--the holding 
company. Thus, some authority must focus on the entire--the consolidated--entity so that 
each of the component regulators is aware of risks that may be unfolding elsewhere in the 
organization that could affect the unit for which it is responsible. This oversight is 
focused on implications for the bank but provides information that will also be shared 
with regulators of nonbank affiliates as well. . . . 
 
As umbrella supervisor, our major emphasis will be on protecting the bank subsidiary and 
on the risk management of the consolidated entity, but the information we generate may 
also be helpful to functional regulators.
135  
 
Comptroller John D. Hawke, Jr., gave a speech in which he provided his assessment of the impact of the 
GLB Act on the regulation of financial institutions: 
 
[A]s far reaching as the new law is, it left entirely unchanged the structure of financial 
regulation . . . . The decision in Gramm-Leach-Bliley not to address fundamental issues 
of supervisory structure struck some as particularly curious in light of developments in 
financial regulation in other countries. . . . [T]hey are increasingly rejecting the confusing 
structural model of U.S. supervision in favor of a unified agency approach . . . .  
                                                 
135 Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Address Regarding Insurance Companies and Banks under the 
New Regulatory Law (Nov. 15, 1999); see also, Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., Vice Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., 
Umbrella Supervision Address, National Association of Urban Bankers (May 26, 2000) (“The activities of the 
Federal Reserve as the umbrella supervisor fall into three broad categories: information gathering and assessment, 
ongoing supervision, and promotion of sound practices and improved disclosure.”) [hereinafter Ferguson Address]; 
Laurence H. Meyer, Address on the Challenges of Global Financial Institution Supervision (May 31, 2000) (“As 
umbrella supervisor, the Federal Reserve seeks to gain an overview of the organization’s activities and to detect 




Of course, the idea of consolidating the federal banking agencies in this country is not a 
new one. . .  
 
Proposals to rearrange the responsibilities of the federal financial agencies have been a 
perennial of public policy for many years. . . .  
. . . .  
Yet none of the proposals for consolidation of bank supervision in a single agency came 
to fruition . . . .  
. . . . 
In Gramm-Leach-Bliley, the unique structure of U.S. bank supervision has again received 
strong affirmation. As in the past, Congress has dispersed many new supervisory 
responsibilities in parallel across the federal banking agencies. . . . [The Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act] preserved the Federal Reserve’s role as the regulator of bank holding 
companies, with the mission of supplementing the work of the primary bank regulators 
by focussing [sic] on risks arising outside the bank . . . . 
. . . . 
Viewed in perspective, I believe the new law simply extends the existing multi-agency 
concept of financial supervision that we’ve been refining for nearly a century. . . .
136 
 
3.  Implementation of the GLB Act 
 
The Board also began to formally implement the GLB Act through promulgation of regulations, action on 
applications, information gathering, and supervisory guidance. It provided general parameters for 
supervisory practice as umbrella supervisor and specific guidance related to reliance on primary and 
functional regulators of banks, securities firms, and insurance firms. 
  Reliance on Primary and Functional Regulators. On March 17, 2000, the Board issued an interim 
rule regarding the securities activities of bank holding companies, which made the following statement 
about umbrella supervision: 
 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act also relies on functional regulation of the securities firm 
by the SEC, full supervision of the depository institution by the appropriate federal 
                                                 
136 John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of the Currency, Statement before the New York Bankers Ass’n (April 6, 2000).  
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banking agency, and umbrella supervision of the overall organization by the Board to 
identify and address potential risks to the depository institution associated with the 
securities and other activities in the organization.
137 
 
In connection with its approval of Charles Schwab’s bank holding company application on May 1, 2000, 
the Board made the following statement about its reliance on the SEC’s functional regulation of Schwab’s 
securities activities:  
 
In view of the fact that, on a pro forma basis, a large majority of Schwab’s activities are 
conducted in subsidiaries that are functionally regulated by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, [so] the Board expects, in carrying out its responsibilities as umbrella 
supervisor, to rely heavily on the Securities and Exchange Commission for examination 
and other supervisory information.
138  
 
On June 22, 2000, the Board’s staff acknowledged its obligation to utilize the findings of primary bank 
supervisors and functional regulators in supervisory guidance on equity investments and merchant 
banking: “Consistent with the Federal Reserve’s role as umbrella supervisor of FHCs and BHCs, 
supervisors should, where appropriate and available, utilize fully the findings of primary bank supervisors 
and functional regulators of holding company affiliates in reviewing the potential risks of equity 
investment activities.”
139 
In connection with its responsibilities as umbrella supervisor of financial holding companies engaged in 
insurance activities, the Board began to collect insurance-related information.
140 In November 2000, the 
Board’s notice of the proposed information collection offered the following explanation:  
 
As an umbrella supervisor, it is essential for the Federal Reserve to evaluate the volume 
and nature of insurance activities conducted by an FHC on a fully consolidated basis. A 
few basic indicators of the nature and volume of the FHC’s insurance business that cut 
across legal entities and business lines will be critical, especially since the number of 
                                                 
137 Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control; Securities Underwriting, Dealing, and Market-Making 
Activities of Financial Holding Companies, 65 Fed. Reg. 14,440, 14,441 (Mar. 17, 2000). 
138 The Charles Schwab Corporation, 86 Fed. Res. Bull. 494, 495 (2000) (italics added). 
139 Fed. Reserve Bd., Letter from Federal Reserve Board to federal bank examiners and supervisors, SR 00-09, (June 
22, 2000). 
140 Fed. Reserve Bd., Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies, New Schedule HC-I to Form 
Y-9C for reports beginning with March 31, 2001. 
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entities and related functional regulators involved with such activities can be substantial 
and impractical for the Federal Reserve to aggregate on its own. Moreover, with 
hundreds of BHCs now qualified as FHCs, monitoring those that have begun to engage in 
insurance activities, and how rapidly they are growing that business, will be extremely 
challenging. Regulatory disclosures will be particularly important for smaller FHCs that 
do not regularly publish statements to the marketplace. By adopting some modest 
reporting supplements to the FR Y9-C, the Federal Reserve will be better prepared to 
tailor and calibrate its supervisory and coordination efforts with functional supervisors on 
an as needed and risk-focused basis. 
 
Simply stated, these data would serve to identify whether the organization has engaged in 
agency business (sales), underwriting and reinsurance activities and indicate the 
approximate size of its reserve positions (which constitute the largest liability for an 
insurance company and the most prominent source of insurer insolvency). These 
“identifiers” will serve as a tool for identifying when the Federal Reserve will need to 
contact and coordinate with functional regulators to get additional information without 
duplicative or onerous burden on the FHC’s functionally-regulated [sic] entities.
141 
 
On April 5, 2004, the Board approved the application of Manulife Financial Corporation to become a bank 
holding company and acquire all the voting shares of John Hancock Financial Services, Inc. In approving 
the application, the Board stated that it contacted and considered information provided by various federal 
and state agencies, including state insurance commissioners. The Board also observed that “a substantial 
portion of the U.S. activities of Manulife and John Hancock are subject to functional regulation by state 
insurance commissioners or the SEC.”
142 Because of this, the Board stated that it would “consistent with 
the provisions of section 5 of the BHC Act as amended by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, rely on the 
appropriate state insurance regulators and the SEC for examination and other supervisory information in 
fulfilling the Board’s responsibilities as a holding company supervisor.”
143 
  Supervisory Practice as Umbrella Supervisor. On August 15, 2000, the Board’s staff issued 
supervisory guidance entitled “Framework for Financial Holding Company Supervision” (“SR 00-13”) 
which addressed umbrella supervision as follows:  
 
                                                 
141 65 Fed. Reg. 69,525, 69,533 (Nov. 17, 2000). 




The Federal Reserve’s supervisory oversight role is that of an umbrella supervisor 
concentrating on a consolidated or group-wide analysis of an organization. Umbrella 
supervision is not viewed as an extension of more traditional bank-like supervision 
throughout an FHC. . . .  
 
The Federal Reserve is responsible for the consolidated supervision of FHCs. In this 
regard, the Federal Reserve will assess the holding company on a consolidated or group-
wide basis with the objective of ensuring that the holding company does not threaten the 
viability of its depository institution subsidiaries. . . .  
 
Depository institution subsidiaries of FHCs are supervised by their appropriate primary 
bank or thrift supervisor (federal and state). The GLB Act did not alter the role of the 
Federal Reserve, as holding company supervisor, vis-a-vis the primary supervisors of 
FHC-associated bank and thrift subsidiaries because the Federal Reserve has traditionally 
relied to the fullest extent possible on those supervisors. 
 
Nonbank (or nonthrift) subsidiaries engaged in securities, commodities or insurance 
activities are supervised by their appropriate functional regulators . . . . 
 
The Federal Reserve, as umbrella supervisor, will seek to determine that FHCs are 
operated in a safe and sound manner so that their financial condition does not threaten the 
viability of affiliated depository institutions. Oversight of FHCs (particularly those 
engaged in a broad range of financial activities) at the consolidated level is important 
because the risks associated with those activities can cut across legal entities and business 
lines. The purpose of FHC supervision is to identify and evaluate, on a consolidated or 
group-wide basis, the significant risks that exist in a diversified holding company in order 
to assess how these risks might affect the safety and soundness of depository institution 
subsidiaries. 
 
Accordingly, the Federal Reserve will focus on the financial strength and stability of 
FHCs, their consolidated risk-management processes, and overall capital adequacy. The 
Federal Reserve will review and assess the internal policies, reports, and procedures and 
effectiveness of the FHC consolidated risk management process. The appropriate bank, 
thrift, or functional regulator will continue to have primary responsibility for evaluating 
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risks, hedging, and risk management at the legal-entity level for the entity or entities that 
it supervises . . . .
144 
 
SR 00-13 went on to describe the broad parameters of financial holding company supervision in practice: 
“The supervisory activities of the Federal Reserve fall into three broad categories: [1] information 
gathering, assessments and supervisory cooperation; [2] ongoing supervision; and [3] promotion of sound 
practices and improved disclosure . . . .”
145 While some aspects of the description related to umbrella 
supervision, the SR letter covered many aspects of the Board’s supervisory activities, including 
consideration of applications, reports and examinations, safety and soundness, capital adequacy, intra-
group exposures, risk concentrations, enforcement powers, promotion of sound practices, and improved 
transparency and public disclosure.  
On December 6, 2004, the Board adopted a new bank holding company examination ratings system, 
effective January 1, 2005. Under the new system, each bank holding company is assigned component and 
composite ratings—R F I/C (D).
146 The Board’s SR letter announcing the change stated:  
 
The revised BHC rating system was developed to align the BHC rating process with the 
Federal Reserve’s current supervisory practices in carrying out consolidated or umbrella 
supervision of BHCs. As such, the revised rating system and the accompanying 
implementation guidance is not intended to signal a shift in the Federal Reserve’s supervisory 
practices of coordinating with and relying to the greatest extent possible on the work of 
primary bank and other functional nonbank regulators.
147 
 
C.  Corporate Governance Developments 
 
Outside of the realm of bank regulators, corporate governance developments began to raise concerns about 
financial reporting, business ethics, and internal controls similar to those addressed by the Board as 
umbrella supervisor related to financial soundness and risk management. The Committee of Sponsoring 
                                                 
144 Fed. Reserve Bd., Letter from Federal Reserve Board to federal bank examiners and supervisors and financial 
holding companies, SR 00-13 (Aug. 15, 2000); see also Ferguson Address, supra note 135. 
145 SR 00-13, supra note 144.  
146 Fed. Res. Bd., Letter from Federal Reserve Board to federal bank examiners and supervisors and regulated 
banking organizations, SR 04-18 (Dec. 6, 2004) (“In this system, ‘R’ stands for risk management, ‘F’ stands for 
financial condition, ‘I’ stands for potential impact of the parent company, ‘C’ stands for composite rating based on 
an evaluation and rating of its managerial and financial condition and an assessment of future potential risk to its 





Organizations of the Treadway Commission (“COSO”) developed standards to improve the quality of 
financial reporting through business ethics, effective internal controls, and corporate governance.
148 
Furthermore, disclosures of accounting fraud and irregularities by large public companies starting in late 
2001 led to the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“S-Ox”).
149 S-Ox created the Public Accounting 
Board and established standards and prohibitions related to auditors, audit committees, financial 
disclosures, internal controls, and conflicts of interest. On October 29, 2002, Federal Reserve Board staff 
issued guidance on the applicability of S-Ox to supervised institutions.
150 In July 2003, COSO issued draft 
guidance on enterprise risk management.
151 In this context, Governor Bies gave a speech about enterprise-
wide risk management and its relationship to umbrella supervision: 
 
One of the challenges the Federal Reserve System has as the umbrella supervisor of 
financial holding companies is to encourage the evolution of corporate governance within 
organizations that keeps pace with changing business strategies. . . . 
. . . . 
Financial institutions are being encouraged to establish enterprise-wide risk management 
functions to ensure that risks of all types, including conflicts of interest, are identified; 
risk appetites are defined; appropriate mitigating controls are effective; and exceptions 
are rigorously reviewed at a high level within the organization.
152  
 
This speech promoted sound practices consistent with views expressed by other Board governors and 
Board staff regarding the Board’s role as umbrella supervisor.  
 
                                                 
148 C OMM. OF SPONSORING  ORG. OF THE TREADWAY  COMM’N,  REPORT OF THE NATIONAL  COMMISSION ON 
FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING (1987); see also, COMM. OF SPONSORING ORG. OF THE TREADWAY COMM’N, 
INTERNAL CONTROL—INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK (1992). 
149 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).  
150 Fed. Reserve Bd., Letter from Federal Reserve Board to federal bank examiners and supervisors and regulated 
banking organizations, SR 02-20 (Oct. 29, 2002); see also, Fed. Reserve Bd., SR 03-8, Letter from Federal Reserve 
Board to federal bank examiners and supervisors and regulated banking organizations (May 5, 2003). 
151 COMM. OF SPONSORING ORG. OF THE TREADWAY COMM’N, EXPOSURE DRAFT, ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT 
FRAMEWORK (2003); see also C OMM. OF SPONSORING  ORG. OF THE TREADWAY  COMM’N, ENTERPRISE  RISK 
MANAGEMENT—INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK 2 (2004) (“This final document defines enterprise risk management as a 
process “applied in strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may affect 
the entity, and manage risk to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement 
of entity objectives.”). 
152 Susan Schmidt Bies, Governor, Fed. Reserve Bd, Address for the Financial Markets and Corporate Governance 
(Feb. 19, 2004). 
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III.  The Board’s Role as Umbrella Supervisor 
 
The preceding historical overview provides the basis for analyzing the previously posed questions: (A) 
What does “umbrella supervision” mean? (B) Is “consolidated supervision” different? (C) How does the 
GLB Act limit the Board’s authority and practice? (D) When did the Board obtain the legal authority to 
allow it to practice umbrella supervision? (E) When did “umbrella supervision” commonly come to refer 
to a set of supervisory practices? (F) What is the relationship between the umbrella supervisor and other 
supervisors?  
 
A.  What Does “Umbrella Supervision” Mean?  
 
The phrase “umbrella supervision” refers to a set of supervisory practices developed by the Board. 
Umbrella supervision is conducted within the parameters of the Board’s legal authority,
153 but is not 
defined by law or regulation; while the GLB Act acknowledged the Board as “umbrella supervisor,” it did 
not define the phrase.
154 However, the statutory acknowledgement of the Board as umbrella supervisor is 
embedded in the statutory scheme as well as in a legislative history which provides guidance for 
understanding the Board’s practices as umbrella supervisor. 
Congressional debate leading up to the enactment of the GLB Act affirmed several things related to the 
regulation and supervision of financial institutions. First, Congress preserved the existing multi-agency 
structure for regulation and supervision of banking, securities, insurance, and other financial institutions.
155 
Second, Congress affirmed functional regulation within a financial holding company’s structure, meaning 
that the SEC should regulate securities activities, state insurance commissioners should regulate insurance 
activities, and the primary federal banking regulators should regulate banking activities.
156 Third, Congress 
saw a need for an “umbrella supervisor” to oversee a financial holding company with a depository 
institution affiliate “as a whole,” “in its entirety,” or on a “consolidated” or “comprehensive” basis.
157 
                                                 
153 Umbrella supervision does not encompass all the Board’s legal supervisory authority. For instance, it is not used 
to describe the Board’s authority to examine national banks under section 11(a)(1) of the Federal Reserve Act. 12 
U.S.C. § 248(a)(1) (2008). 
154 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 307, 113 Stat. 1415 (1999). 
155 Jose de Luna Martinez & Thomas A. Rose, International Survey of Integrated Financial Sector Supervision 
(World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 3096, 2003) (observing that Congress did not adopt an integrated 
model of supervision with one supervisor for all financial institutions operating in the banking, securities, and 
insurance sectors, although this approach has been adopted in many countries). 
156 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Titles II, III, 113 Stat. 1385, 1407 (1999). 
157 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 106-44, at 16 (1999) (“[T]here is a need for oversight of the organization as a whole as well 
as subsidiaries not subject to functional regulation.”); Bank Modernization Legislation: Hearing Before H. Comm. 
on Banking and Fin. Servs., 106th Cong. 3 (1997) (statement of James L. Bothwell, Chief Economist, GAO) 
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Fourth, Congress preferred the Board in the role of supervisor for all bank holding companies rather than 
assign this responsibility to the primary bank regulator of the lead bank in a holding company group.
158 
Finally, Congress limited the Board’s oversight role by adding the so-called “Fed Lite” provisions to 
proposed legislation.
159  
Turning to the GLB Act itself, Congress acknowledged the Board as umbrella supervisor in section 307:  
 
It is the intention of the Congress that the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, as the umbrella supervisor for financial holding companies, and the State 
insurance regulators, as the functional regulators of companies engaged in insurance 
activities, coordinate efforts to supervise companies that control both a depository 
institution and a company engaged in insurance activities regulated under State law.
160 
 
This acknowledgement of the Board as “umbrella supervisor” can be viewed in several ways. First, this 
section resides within a scheme of functional regulation where the primary regulator is determined by the 
activity or product rather than the type of entity. Therefore, the acknowledgement of the Board as 
“umbrella supervisor” implies a supplemental role for the Board to play in relation to functionally 
regulated entities. Second, this section expresses congressional intent that the “umbrella supervisor” 
coordinate supervision and share information with insurance regulators. Thus, the closest connection 
between the term “umbrella supervisor” and a supervisory function is one of coordination, cooperation, 
and sharing of information with state insurance regulators. Finally, the acknowledgement of the Board as 
“umbrella supervisor” can be taken to affirm the Board’s existing supervisory practices as “umbrella 
supervisor.”  
After enactment of the GLB Act, the Board and its staff used the phrase “umbrella supervision” as a 
synonym for “consolidated supervision,” describing the following set of supervisory practices: (a) 
requiring reports of a bank holding company and any subsidiary; (b) conducting examinations of a bank 
holding company and any subsidiary; (c) setting capital requirements for bank holding companies and all 
                                                                                                                                                             
(advocating regulation of financial services holding companies on a “consolidated, comprehensive basis” with the 
SEC, OCC, or Board being “responsible and accountable as the umbrella supervisor for operations of the holding 
company in its entirety.”). 
158 See e.g., Ludwig, supra note 1, Financial System, supra note 70. 
159 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, § 111. 
160 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 307. 
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subsidiaries; and (d) taking enforcement actions against a bank holding company and its nonbank 
subsidiaries.
161 
The Board and its staff also used “umbrella supervision” to describe the following practices: (a) assessing 
consolidated risk for banking organizations as a whole;
162 (b) taking remedial action to address threats to 
depository institution subsidiaries of bank holding companies from outside of depository institutions 
themselves;
163 and (c) sharing information with functional regulators and primary federal banking 
regulators.
164 This set of supervisory practices usually focuses on the Board’s supervision of functionally 
regulated subsidiaries, such as securities, insurance, and commodities firms; however, they can relate to 
bank subsidiaries of a bank holding company. 
 
B.  Is “Consolidated Supervision” Different? 
 
The Board and its staff use the term “consolidated supervision” as a shorthand description for a set of 
supervisory practices: the requiring of reports, conducting of examinations, setting capital requirements, 
and taking enforcement actions against bank holding companies and their subsidiaries.
165 The term 
“consolidated supervision” also appears frequently in Basel Committee issuances.
166 Although similar 
phrases appear in the laws and regulations applicable to financial institutions, the specific term 
                                                 
161 See, e.g, Letter from Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., to Senator Tim Johnson (June 25, 2003) 
[hereinafter Greenspan Letter] (provided as additional material for Hearing Before H. Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 90-91 (2003)); Industrial Loan Companies: Hearing Before H. Subcomm. 
on Fin. Institutions and Consumer Credit, 109th Cong. 4 (2006) [hereinafter Alvarez Testimony 1] (statement of 
Scott G. Alvarez, General Counsel, Federal Reserve Board); Industrial Loan Companies: Hearing Before S. Comm. 
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 4-5 (2007) [hereinafter Alvarez Testimony 2] (statement of 
Scott G. Alvarez, General Counsel, Federal Reserve Board). 
162 See, e.g., Fed. Res. Bd. Letter, SR 00-13 supra note 144 (“The Federal Reserve’s supervisory oversight role is 
that of an umbrella supervisor concentrating on a consolidated or group-wide analysis of an organization.”).  
163 See, e.g., Fergson Address, supra note 135 (“In conducting our oversight, our specific goal will be to assess how 
a company’s activities might affect the safety and soundness of its affiliated depository institutions.”). 
164 Section 307 of the GLB Act expresses congressional intention that the Board share information and coordinate 
supervision with state insurance regulators. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 307. 
165 See e.g., Greenspan Letter, supra note 161; Alvarez Testimony 1, supra note 161; Alvarez Testimony 2, supra 
note 161. 
166  See e.g., Frederick R. Dahl, Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices: Revised Basel 
Concordat on Principles for the Supervision of Banks’ Foreign Establishments, 22 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 900 
(1983); BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR SUPERVISION OF INTERNATIONAL 
BANKING GROUPS AND THEIR CROSS-BORDER ESTABLISHMENTS (1992); BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, 
THE SUPERVISION OF CROSS-BORDER BANKING, ANNEX B (1996).  
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“consolidated supervision” does not appear in the laws or regulations governing financial institutions in the 
United States.
167  
Is consolidated supervision different from umbrella supervision? It depends on the context. Sometimes the 
terms “umbrella supervision” and “consolidated supervision” are used in close proximity. For instance, 
guidance from the Board’s staff on financial holding company supervision used the terms “umbrella 
supervisor” and “consolidated supervision” in the topic sentences of sequential paragraphs.
168 Sometimes 
the terms are combined, as in Chairman Greenspan’s use of the phrase “consolidated umbrella 
supervision” in testimony on banking supervision before a House subcommittee.
169 Sometimes the terms 
“consolidated supervision” and “umbrella supervision” are used interchangeably, as in the Board staff’s 
statement that its “revised rating system was developed to align the BHC rating process with the Federal 
Reserve’s current supervisory practices in carrying out consolidated or umbrella supervision.”
170  
Thus, the terms “umbrella supervision” and “consolidated supervision” sometimes refer to the same group 
of practices—requiring reports, conducting examinations, setting capital requirements, and the taking of 
enforcement action against bank holding companies and their subsidiaries. At other times, umbrella 
supervision refers to a different group of practices—the assessing of risk for a banking organization as a 
whole, the taking of remedial action to address outside threats to depository institution subsidiaries, and 
the sharing of information with functional regulators and primary federal banking regulators. These 
varying usages of the term “umbrella supervision” reflect different ways of thinking about supervision; 
namely, rules-based and risk-based approaches to supervision.  
 
C.  How Does the GLB Act Limit the Board’s Authority and Practice?  
 
The GLB Act did not alter the Board’s general authority over bank subsidiaries of bank holding 
companies. The Board may still require reports from and conduct examinations of all bank holding 
company subsidiaries, but the Board must rely on reports and examinations of other regulators to the 
                                                 
167 For similar but not identical phrases, see 12 U.S.C. § 3105(d)(2)(A) (2000) (“comprehensive supervision or 
regulation on a consolidated basis”); 12 C.F.R. § 211.24(c)(1)(ii) (2007) (“comprehensive consolidated super-
vision”); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(13)(ii)(B) (2007) (“consolidated, comprehensive supervision”).  
168 SR 00-13, supra note 144. 
169 Hearing Before H. Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Securities and Government Sponsored Enterprises, 105th 
Cong. 333 (1997) [hereinafter Greenspan Testimony] (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd.). 
170 Fed. Res. Bd., Bank Holding Company Rating System, SR 04-18 (Dec. 6, 2004). “The revised BHC rating 
system was developed to align the BHC rating process with the Federal Reserve’s current supervisory practices in 
carrying out consolidated or umbrella supervision of BHCs.” Id. (emphasis added); Meyer, supra note 135 (“The 
consolidated, or umbrella, supervisor aims to keep the relevant regulators informed about overall risk-taking and to 
identify and evaluate the myriad risks that extend throughout such diversified bank and financial holding companies 




171 The Board may only obtain reports or conduct examinations of functionally 
regulated subsidiaries of bank holding companies in specified instances related to material risks, threats to 
depository institution subsidiaries, or compliance with laws within the Board’s specific jurisdiction.
172 The 
Board retains its authority to adopt consolidated capital adequacy guidelines for bank holding companies, 
but the Board may not impose capital requirements directly on broker-dealers, insurance companies, or 
other subsidiaries in compliance with requirements of their functional regulators.
173 The Board can take 
enforcement action against a functionally regulated subsidiary only to address a material risk to a 
depository institution or the payment system that cannot be effectively addressed by taking action against 
an affiliated depository institution or against depository institutions generally.
174  
 
D.  When Did the Board Obtain the Legal Authority to Allow It to Practice Umbrella 
Supervision? 
 
The Board obtained the legal authority within to practice umbrella supervision over domestic institutions 
when it obtained explicit authority to require reports, conduct examinations, set capital requirements, and 
take enforcement action against bank holding companies and their subsidiaries. This occurred 
incrementally. In 1933, the Board possessed supervisory authority over companies controlling a member 
bank that wished to vote shares of those member banks.
175 In 1956, the Board obtained the power to 
require reports from and conduct examinations of multi-bank holding companies.
176 In 1970, the Board 
obtained the authority to require reports and conduct examinations of one-bank holding companies.
177 In 
1978, Congress granted the Board the explicit authority to order a bank holding company to divest a 
nonbank subsidiary or cease activity and the power to issue cease-and-desist orders against bank holding 
companies in connection with the violation of law, regulation, or agreement in writing, or to stop unsafe 
and unsound practices.
178 In 1983, Congress gave the Board explicit authority to set capital 
requirements.
179 By 1983, therefore, the Board had accumulated all the powers to allow it to practice 
umbrella supervision.  
                                                 
171 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 111, 113 Stat. 1362 (1999). 
172 Id. § 111, 113 Stat. at 1362-63. 
173 Id. § 111, 113 Stat. at 1365. 
174 Id. § 111, 113 Stat. at 1369. 
175 Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, § 5(c), 48 Stat. 165. 
176 Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 137. 
177 Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, 84 Stat. 176. 
178 Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 105(a), 92 Stat. 
3646. 
179 International Lending Supervision Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181, § 908, 97 Stat. 1280. 
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In 1999, the GLB Act gave the Board jurisdiction over securities and insurance subsidiaries of FHCs 
through the repeal of prohibitions on affiliations between bank, securities, and insurance firms. This 
extended the supervisory authority and enforcement power of the Board over securities firms and 
insurance companies under the umbrella of a parent company that also owned or controlled a bank. With 
regard to depository institution subsidiaries of bank holding companies, the Board already possessed the 
authority to assess risk on a consolidated basis and share information with banking regulators, but the GLB 
Act gave the Board the authority for the first time to require divestiture of depository institution 
subsidiaries.
180 Therefore, in 1999, the Board possessed the authority, albeit subject to some limitations, to 
assess risk on a groupwide basis, take remedial action to address threats from outside of the depository 
institution subsidiary, and share information with primary bank and functional regulators.  
 
E.  When Did “Umbrella Supervision” Commonly Come to Refer to a Set of Supervisory 
Practices?  
 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the phrase “umbrella supervision” was adopted by federal legislators and 
bank regulators to refer to supervisory practices engaged in by the Board and other existing or proposed 
regulators. In 1987, legislators and commentators began to refer to “umbrella supervision” when a 
Congressional proposal to establish a new framework for supervision of domestic financial institutions 
emerged. In November 1987, Senator Wirth co-sponsored legislation to establish a Financial Services 
Oversight Commission
181 with responsibility for consolidated supervision of domestic financial 
institutions by function rather than type of institution.
182  
                                                
Shortly thereafter, articles appeared in the press describing the Financial Services Oversight Commission 
as an “umbrella agency.”
183 In 1990, a member of Board staff characterized the Board’s authority over 
 
180 Previously, the Board could only issue a cease-and-desist order against a depository institution subsidiary, or 
order the divestiture of a nonbank subsidiary. See Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 105(a), 92 Stat. 3646 (1978); H.R. REP. NO. 
95-1383, at 19 (1978). 
181 S. 1891, 100th Cong. (1987). The bill was based in large part on a proposal by E. Gerald Corrigan, president of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. E. GERALD CORRIGAN, FINANCIAL MARKET STRUCTURE: A LONGER VIEW 
(1987). For an overview of 24 proposals for regulatory restructuring going back to the 1930s. See Kushmeider, 
supra note 63. 
182 S. 1891, 100th Cong. (daily ed. 1987) (“This Commission would provide an umbrella supervisory structure. The 
Commission could regulate activities of banking, financial and commercial holding companies and establish 
minimum standards of capital adequacy for financial holding companies.”); see also S. 2433, 101st Cong. (1990); 
133 CONG. REC. S16675 (Nov. 20, 1987); 136 CONG. REC. S4246 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 1990). 
183 See Nathaniel C. Nash, Fed Backs Regulatory Umbrella, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1987, at D1 (“The chairman of the 
Federal Reserve Board today supported the creation of an umbrella agency to more closely coordinate policy among 
the major Government bodies that regulate financial institutions.”). While this article characterized Chairman 
Greenspan’s support for the creation of the Financial Services Oversight Commission proposed by S. 1981 as 
support for the creation of an “umbrella agency,” Chairman Greenspan did not use the phrase “umbrella agency” in 
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foreign banks with U.S. operations as “umbrella supervisory authority” in congressional testimony.
184 In 
1991, Treasury issued a report recommending “umbrella oversight” of financial services holding 
companies by either the Board or primary regulator of its lead bank.
185 In 1992, a journal article referred to 
“expanding the umbrella” of the Board’s supervision of foreign banks with operations in the United 
States.
186 Between 1991 and 1999, legislators, regulators, and commentators continued to use “umbrella 




F.  What Is the Relationship between the Umbrella and Other Supervisors? 
 
Understanding the relationship between the umbrella and other supervisors involves matters of priority, 
cooperation, and responsibility. As to priority, the GLB Act preserved the independent and lead 
responsibility of the primary federal bank regulators and functional regulators for supervising institutions 
and activities under their jurisdiction. Umbrella supervision does not duplicate or replace supervision by 
                                                                                                                                                             
his testimony before the Senate Banking Committee. Cf. id.; see also, Lionel Barber, Greenspan Set to Compromise 
Over Banking Reform in US, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1987, at 48 (“The idea of establishing an umbrella regulatory body 
to supervise US financial markets was backed yesterday by Mr. Alan Greenspan ”); Nathaniel C. Nash, A New 
Urgency for Reforms in Policing Securities Trades, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 17, 1987, at D4 (“Many securities experts . . . 
argue that regulation requires a major umbrella agency overseeing all segments of finance and closely coordinating 
[the] parts.”). 
184 William Taylor, Staff Dir., Div. of Banking Supervision and Regulation, Fed. Res. Bd., Statement Before the 
Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives (Oct. 16, 1990), in 76 Fed. Res. 
Bull. 1032 (1990). 
185 See Financial System, supra note 70.  
186 Daniel B. Gail, et al., The Foreign Bank Supervision Act of 1991: Expanding the Umbrella of “Supervisory 
Reregulation”, 26 INT’L LAW 993 (1992). 
187 During House debate on House Bill 6, Representative Dingell said: “[I]t preserves to the Federal Reserve Board 
its current role of an umbrella regulator of the holding company.” 137 CONG. REC. 29265 (1991) (statement of Rep. 
Dingell). During House debate on House Bill 10, Representative Kelly said: “[T]he Federal Reserve Board will 
remain the umbrella supervisor.” 144 CONG. REC. H3140 (daily ed. May 13, 1997) (statement of Rep. Kelly). 
Modernization of the Financial Services Regulatory Systems: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Banking and Fin. 
Servs., 104th Cong. 10 (1995) (testimony of Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Fed. Reserve Bd.) (“[W]e must not 
lose sight, and the Leach bill does not, that the umbrella supervisor must still be permitted to monitor both the 
financial condition of the organization and the potential transfer of risks to the insured depository affiliates.”); see 
also Bank Modernization Legislation: Hearing Before H. Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs., 106th Cong. 3 (1997) 
(statement of James L. Bothwell, Chief Economist, GAO) (“The holding company regulation provided by the 
Federal Reserve can be referred to as ‘umbrella’ type regulation.”); see infra note 181. In 1996, the president of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland wrote: “Closer connections among firms in the financial intermediation, risk 
management, and payments businesses suggest that an umbrella supervisor of some sort will likely be needed . . . .” 
Jerry L. Jordon, The Future of Banking Supervision, ECONOMIC COMMENTARY, April 1, 1996, at 4. 
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primary federal bank supervisors or functional regulators.
188 The Board’s role in relationship to functional 
supervisors and primary federal bank regulators of FHC subsidiaries is secondary and supplemental.  
The Board’s supplemental role is mandated by the Fed Lite provisions of the GLB Act.
189 The Board must 
rely on reports and examinations of other regulators to the fullest extent possible. In unusual situations 
involving certain material risks, compliance with the law, or threats to an insured depository institution 
subsidiary, the Board can seek special reports through other regulators or seek information directly from 
supervised entities through reports or examinations.
190 The Board may adopt consolidated capital require-
ments, but compliance with the capital requirements of functional regulators prevents the Board from 
imposing more stringent capital requirements on functionally regulated subsidiaries.
191 A functional 
regulator can also prevent the Board from requiring a functionally regulated subsidiary to contribute funds 
or assets to an affiliated depository institution if the functional regulator determines that the transfer would 
have a material adverse effect on the functionally regulated entity.
192 These GLB Act limitations delineate 
a secondary and supplemental role for the Board in relation to primary bank and functional regulators.  
The supplemental role of the Board is reinforced by remarks of regulators about umbrella supervision. For 
instance, in 1995, James L. Bothwell of the GAO testified: “The holding company regulation provided by 
the Federal Reserve can be referred to as ‘umbrella’ type regulation because it is in addition to other 
regulation of holding company subsidiaries . . . .”
193 In 1997, Chairman Greenspan testified: “The 
Congress, in its review of financial modernization, must consider legal entity supervision alone versus 
legal entity supervision supplemented by umbrella supervision.”
194 In 2000, Comptroller Hawke said the 
GLB Act “preserved the Federal Reserve’s role as the regulator of bank holding companies, with the 
mission of supplementing the work of the primary bank regulators by focu[sing] on risks arising outside 
the bank.”
195  
                                                 
188 The Condition of the U.S. Banking System: Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 
107th Cong. 53 (2001) (appendix report of Staff of Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) (“Such 
supervision is not intended to impose bank-like supervision on FHCs, nor is it intended to duplicate or replace 
supervision by the primary bank, thrift, or functional regulators of FHC subsidiaries.”).. 
189 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 111, 113 Stat. 1362-66. 
190 Id. § 111, 113 Stat. at 1362-63. 
191 Id. § 111, 113 Stat. at 1365. 
192 Id. § 111, 113 Stat. at 1369. 
193 Modernization of the Financial Services Regulatory System: Hearing Before H. Comm. on Banking and Fin. 
Servs.,, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of James L. Bothwell, Director, Financial Institutions and Markets Issues, 
GAO) (emphasis added). 
194 See Greenspan Testimony, supra note 169 (emphasis added). 
195 Hawke, supra note 136 (typographical mistake in original corrected) 
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While the Board’s role as umbrella supervisor is secondary and supplemental, it is also clear that the Board 
has the final word in certain situations.
196 For instance, while the Board must rely upon reports to other 
regulators to the fullest extent possible, the Board may require any bank holding company subsidiary to 
submit reports to keep the Board informed of its financial condition, systems for monitoring and 
controlling risk, and transactions with depository institution subsidiaries.
197 In addition, subject to 
satisfaction of certain conditions, the Board may conduct an examination of a functionally regulated 
subsidiary in connection with material risks to a depository institution subsidiary of a financial holding 
company.
198 Furthermore, and once again subject to certain conditions, the Board may take enforcement 
action against a functionally regulated subsidiary to address a material risk posed to an affiliated 
depository institution or the domestic or international payments system.
199 Despite limitations, the Board 
has ultimate authority to obtain reports, conduct examinations, and take enforcement action in critical 
situations.  
Understanding the relationship between the umbrella and other regulators also requires a grasp of the many 
forms of cooperation among them. On a regulatory level, the Board routinely works with the primary 
federal bank regulators to implement uniform regulations, standards, forms, and guidance through the 
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council. On the supervisory level, the Board and other 
regulators routinely interact with each other in the following ways: sharing information; obtaining reports 
on each other’s behalf; coordinating the timing and focus of examinations; participating in joint 
examinations; relying on each other’s findings and evaluations; consulting with each other before taking 
action; and deferring to each other’s judgment in appropriate situations. These cooperative efforts were 
affirmed by, yet long precede, the GLB Act, as they go back to the origin of bank holding company 
supervision in the Banking Act of 1933.
200  
                                                 
196 Meyer, supra note 135 (“Given the systemic risk associated with the disruption of the operations of large banks . 
. . the Federal Reserve believes that it needs to know more about the activities within large insured depository 
institutions than can be derived from access to public information or from the reports of the primary bank 
supervisor.”). 
197 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(1)(B)(i); id. § 1844(c)(1)(B)(iii)(I); id. § 1844(c)(1)(B)(iii)(II); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 
1999 § 111, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338; see also supra text accompanying notes 108-10. 
198 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(2); id. § 1844(c)(2)(B); id. § 1844(c)(2)(E); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 111; see also supra 
text accompanying notes 111-13. 
199 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 113, 113 Stat. at 1369. 
200 See 1934 FED. RES. BD. ANN. REP. 54. (1935). Under the GLB Act, for instance, the Board must consult with the 
appropriate state insurance authorities before authorizing a financial holding company or insured depository 
institution to affiliate with a company engaged in insurance activities. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 307(c), 113 
Stat. at 1416. 
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At times, the complicated and overlapping regulatory schemes for financial institutions present challenges 
to effective supervision.
201 There may be gaps in regulation or supervision, and confusion or hesitation 
may arise with respect to supervisory responsibility when dealing with an activity or product that involves 
many legal entities or business lines within a financial holding company structure. Supervisory agencies 
may resist the involvement of other regulators. Meeting these challenges requires constant effort to 
improve cooperation.  
As to responsibility, the umbrella supervisor focuses on different concerns than those of the primary bank 
and functional regulators. First, the regulators have different statutory responsibilities: bank regulators 
focus on prudent operation, securities regulators focus on disclosure to investors, and insurance regulators 
focus on solvency. Second, the umbrella supervisor assesses and responds to risk for the organization as a 
whole rather than risk posed to a single legal entity within that organization. Third, the umbrella supervisor 
addresses threats arising from outside, rather than inside, a depository institution: the umbrella supervisor 
seeks to prevent the transfer of risks from a nonbank subsidiary to a depository institution subsidiary and 
the deposit insurance fund. Finally, the umbrella supervisor facilitates the sharing of information among 
functional and banking regulators.  
 
IV.  Conclusion 
 
The preceding analysis demonstrates that umbrella supervision is a set of supervisory practices conducted 
within the scope of the Board’s legal authority. Although Congress acknowledged and limited Board 
practice in the GLB Act, it did not define umbrella supervisory practice. In one sense, the phrase “umbrella 
supervision” is a synonym for the Board’s consolidated supervision practices related to reporting 
requirements, examinations, capital oversight, and enforcement powers. In another sense, umbrella 
supervision focuses on assessing consolidated risk, reacting to threats from outside depository institutions, 
and sharing information with other regulators. The Board possessed all the powers necessary for it to 
practice umbrella supervision in 1983. The Board’s potential to practice umbrella supervision expanded to 
functionally regulated subsidiaries in 1999. The term “umbrella supervision” came into common usage in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. It requires respect for the primary and secondary roles of regulators for 
supervision of various entities, cooperation between the umbrella and other regulators, and understanding 
                                                 
201 Concerns with duplication, confusion, and burden caused by overlapping jurisdiction arise frequently. See, e.g., 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Insts. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 93d Cong. 619 
(1973); 55 CONG. REC. 1580-81 (Apr. 30, 1917); 144 CONG. REC. H3130 (daily ed. May 13, 1998) (statement of 
Rep. Gillmor); 1938 FED. RESERVE BD. ANN. REP. 13-15 (1939); Financial System, supra note 70; Jerry Knight, 





the responsibilities of the umbrella and other regulators. Umbrella supervision is an important part of the 
supervision of financial institutions in the United States. 
 
 